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INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses the gender equality arguments advanced
either to support or to oppose Turkey’s ban on wearing
headscarves. 1 As recently as 2005, Turkey defended a challenge to
the ban before the European Court of Human Rights. In ahin v.
Turkey, the Court held that the ban did not offend the petitioner’s
right to religious freedom under the European Convention on Human
* Associate director of adolescent health programs of the National
Partnership for Women & Families and adjunct professor at American University,
Washington College of Law. The author would like to thank Zinaida Miller,
Fernanda Nicola, and Naomi Schoenbaum for their comments on an earlier draft;
Derya Tokdemir and Amanda Sloat for their assistance in locating relevant cases;
Janet Halley for her advice in shaping the concept of this Article; Padideh Ala’i,
Susan Carle, and the organizers of the 2008 symposium, “Turkey: At the
Crossroads of the Secular West and Traditional East,” and Paul Gugliuzza for his
support of this writing project.
1. JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL 16-18 (2007)
(describing the dress that covers a woman’s head in observance of Islamic
religious tenets).
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Rights (“ECHR”). 2 The majority defended Turkey’s interest in
secularism, in part by tying secularism to the protection of gender
equality. 3 The majority opinion reflected the view that the ban freed
women from religious beliefs that signify subordination, and
liberated them from the societal pressures to adopt certain patriarchal
practices. 4 The dissent in ahin also invoked gender equality, but
reached the opposite conclusion: the prohibition on, or stigmatization
of, the choice to wear a headscarf in compliance with one’s religious
beliefs undermined women’s autonomy and denied some women
access to higher education. 5
This Article focuses on how ahin’s majority and dissent employ a
substantive account of gender equality with very different outcomes
in mind. In brief, substantive equality is a departure from classic or
formal equality (or treating likes alike) and from equal treatment
(ensuring that laws or policies apply to everyone in the same way). 6
Substantive equality, by contrast, is concerned that laws and
customary practices do not diminish women’s access to societal
goods or perpetuate discrimination. 7 The aim of substantive equality
analysis is to use law to remedy past and present disadvantage 8 by
2. See ahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173,
¶¶ 121-123 (see infra Part II).
3. See id. ¶ 115; see also discussion, infra Part II.
4. See id. ¶ 111; see also discussion, infra Part II.
5. See id. ¶¶ 17-19 (Tulkens, J., dissenting); see also discussion, infra Part II.
6. See Sandra Fredman, Beyond the Dichotomy of Formal and Substantive
Equality: Towards a New Definition of Equal Rights, in TEMPORARY SPECIAL
MEASURES: ACCELERATING DE FACTO EQUALITY OF WOMEN UNDER ARTICLE 4(1)
UN CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN 111, 112 (Ineke Boerefijn et al. eds., 2003) (arguing that formal
equality is insufficient because it fails to address societal structures that perpetually
disadvantage women because of their difference to men).
7. See id. at 114 (contrasting the traditional view of equality whereby
everyone is treated alike with an equality of results approach, which focuses on
“equalizing the starting point” by giving women equal access to the benefits of
society).
8. See id. at 115 (arguing that the removal of barriers in an effort to treat men
and women alike is, by itself, insufficient to reach gender equality and should be
accompanied by positive measures aimed at restructuring society to redistribute
power and resources); Michael Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal
Opportunity: A Jurisprudential Appraisal, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1703 (1986)
(“Alternatively, the normative aims of the postulate of equality may be satisfied if
goods could be distributed so that each individual were able to realize fully his lifeplan . . . . [T]hough this distribution would be marginally unequal, a global
equality would result as measured by the satisfaction of each individual’s life-
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examining the context or “lived-experiences” of those to whom
equality in result is due. 9 As will be discussed further below, the
majority opinion and the dissent of ahin invoke the right to
substantive equality based on conflicting accounts of women’s
experience of wearing a headscarf. This is problematic in one sense
because the majority opinion and dissent offered scant reasoning to
support their view. But more fundamentally, the Court’s reasoning
calls into question the usefulness of substantive equality for
understanding the implications of Turkey’s headscarf ban.
Part I of this Article will provide a short history of the headscarf
ban, and Part II will examine the treatment of gender equality by the
Court in ahin. Next, Part III will test the assumptions of the Court
by considering the objectives of the women’s rights movement in
Turkey and the influence of the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of the Discrimination Against Women
(“CEDAW”) on reception of substantive equality principles. 10 Last,
this Article will conclude with a critique of substantive equality and
suggest that recent cases decided by the Constitutional Court of
Turkey underscore problems with thinking of the ban in terms of
substantive gender equality.

I. BACKGROUND
The ban on the headscarf at universities (and in other stateoperated institutions) has been justified as necessary to protect
Turkey’s commitment to a secular society and state, as enshrined in
the Turkish Constitution. 11 At the collapse of the Ottoman Empire
plan.”) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). See generally CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 215 (1989);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES – MEN’S LAWS 54 (2005).
9. See Hanna Beate Schöpp-Schilling, Reflections on a General
Recommendation of Article 4(1) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, in TEMPORARY SPECIAL MEASURES:
ACCELERATING DE FACTO EQUALITY OF WOMEN UNDER ARTICLE 4(1) UN
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
WOMEN 15, 26 (Ineke Boerefijn et al. eds., 2003) (suggesting that gender-neutral
laws perpetuate discrimination because they are interpreted from a male
perspective and do not account for women’s life experiences).
10. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
11. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi [TURK. CONST.] art. 2 (“The Republic of
Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law;
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after World War I, victorious states sought to carve up the region. A
former Ottoman army officer, Mustafa “Atatürk” Kemal, resisted
encroachment of the World War I powers. 12 Atatürk envisioned a
complete break from the religious character of the Ottoman Empire
by creating a secular, democratic Turkey. 13 By 1922, Atatürk’s
forces abolished the most visible Ottoman-era imperial and Islamic
symbols 14 and declared the new nation the Republic of Turkey in
1923. 15 Upon creation of the Republic of Turkey, Atatürk attempted
to erase the previous influence and connection between the region’s
laws and Islam by drafting a new constitution and new statutes. 16
Religious schools came under the control of the government and
religious expression was curtailed through the regulation of dress and
speech, although the headscarf was not then regulated. 17
bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice;
respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the
fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble.”). See generally Martha Minow,
Tolerance in an Age of Terror, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 453 (2007) (detailing an
over-reaction as well as an under-reaction to the perceived threat of fundamentalist
Islam).
12. See Molly Greene, The Ottoman Experience, 134 DAEDALUS 88, 89 (2005)
(discussing Atatürk’s efforts at the close of World War I to create a secular state
that might better respond to European imperialism).
13. See id. at 91, 96-98 (explaining that the Ottoman Empire sought to
consolidate its power by emphasizing a shared nationalism through the Muslim
identity of its subjects, which was at odds with practices of Ottoman rule that
allowed local elites to amass power).
14. See OMER TASPINAR, BROOKINGS INST., AN UNEVEN FIT? THE “TURKISH
MODEL” AND THE ARAB WORLD 20 (2003), available at http://www.brookings
.edu/papers/2003/08islamicworld_taspinar.aspx (noting the abolishment of the
Sultanate and the Caliphate).
15. Greene, supra note 12, at 89.
16. See Dora Glidewell Nadolski, Ottoman and Secular Civil Law, 8 INT’L J.
MIDDLE EAST STUD. 517, 527 (1977) (noting that Atatürk spent 1924 to 1926
trying to convince the nation and legal scholars of the importance of adopting a
Western civil code system). Scholarship shows that the secularization of Turkish
law, as evidenced by the transplantation of the Swiss Civil Code, was a process in
motion before the establishment of the Republic. Id. at 519-26.
17. See Benjamin D. Bleiberg, Note, Unveiling the Real Issue: Evaluating the
European Court of Human Rights’ Decision to Enforce the Turkish Headscarf Ban
in Leyla ahin v. Turkey, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 134-35 (2005) (outlining the
genesis of regulation restricting certain religious dress); Özlem Denli, Freedom of
Religion: Secularist Policies and Islamic Challenges, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
TURKEY at 87, 90 (Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat ed., 2007) (cataloging several of the
significant secular changes made to Turkish law in the late 1920s and 30s); see
also Seval Yildirim, Aftermath of a Revolution: A Case Study of Turkish Family
Law, 17 PACE INT’L L. REV. 347, 368-69 (2005) (noting that the rhetoric of
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Upon Atatürk’s death in 1946, the single party system began to
deteriorate and political parties challenging secularism started to
amass power. 18 Beginning in 1960, military coups erupted in
response to perceived threats to Atatürk’s secular nationalism. 19 In
1980 the military-controlled National Security Council (“NSC”)
introduced a new constitution and seized control of the legislative
process. 20 The NSC successfully overturned legislative measures that
recognized or protected religious practices and expression. 21
The Constitution supported by the NSC, established in 1982,
prohibited any constitutional amendment or law that would
contradict the principle of secularism. 22 In addition, the Constitution
guaranteed an array of civil and political liberties, and included a
non-discrimination statement prohibiting sex discrimination. 23 These
constitutional protections were undermined by the government’s
ability to limit or to derogate from the enforcement of rights in order
to defend principles like secularism. 24
breaking from the religious aspects of Ottoman governance was “exaggerated” and
designed more for public mobilization and does not reflect of the state of Ottoman
law reform before the revolution).
18. See Bleiberg, supra note 17, at 135-36 (commenting that after Atatürk’s
death, private religious schools were allowed to open, religious classes were
offered in public primary secondary schools, and Islamic religious education
became mandatory in public schools).
19. Id. at 136 (describing the 1960 military coup that emphasized secularism).
20. Id. at 137-39.
21. See id. at 138 (explaining that, in reaction to separatist movements by
Islamic groups, the drafters of the 1982 Constitution were focused on protecting
secularism and the indivisibility of the nation); Christopher D. Belelieu, Note, The
Headscarf as a Symbolic Enemy of the European Court of Human Rights’
Democratic Jurisprudence: Viewing Islam Through a European Legal Prism in
Light of the Sahin Judgment, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 573, 581 (2006) (describing the
NSC as one of the “main guardians of secularism”) (citation omitted).
22. Id. art. 4 (“The provision of Article 1 of the Constitution establishing the
form of the state as a Republic, the provisions in Article 2 on the characteristics of
the Republic, and the provision of Article 3 shall not be amended, nor shall their
amendment be proposed.”).
23. Id. art. 10 (“All individuals are equal without any discrimination before the
law, irrespective of language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical
belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations.”).
24. See, e.g., id. art. 14 (“None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the
Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of
the state with its territory and nation, and endangering the existence of the
democratic and secular order of the Turkish Republic based upon human rights.”);
see Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, Collisions and Crossroads: Introducing Human
Rights in Turkey, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY, supra note 17, at 1, 6 (Zehra F.
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The rationale for banning the headscarf at universities was to
promote secularist values. 25 The 1981 Regulation Concerning the
Dress of Students and Staff in Schools prohibited the headscarf, and
the Higher Education Council banned headscarves in lecture rooms
in 1982. 26 The ban was upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court,
not only as a means to protect secularism but also as a measure to
promote gender equality. 27 In its judgment, the Supreme
Administrative Court stated that “[b]eyond being a mere innocent
practice, wearing the headscarf is . . . becoming the symbol of a
vision that is contrary to the freedoms of women and the
fundamental principles of the Republic.” 28 In a subsequent decision,
the Constitutional Court overturned a law that would have granted
amnesty to students disciplined for wearing the headscarf while the
application of the ban was unclear. 29
In 1988, the Parliament attempted to soften the application of the
ban. The Higher Education Act was amended to allow for a
headscarf “covering the neck and hair” to be worn at universities, 30
but the Constitutional Court found the law in violation of the
“principles of secularism, equality before the law, and . . . freedom of
religion.” 31 The Constitutional Court held that embedded in these
Kabasakal Arat ed., 2007) (stating that the NSC argued that derogation from
individual freedoms and rights under the 1982 Constitution was necessary to curb
“excessive freedoms” of the 1961 Constitution); Bleiberg, supra note 17, at 139
(arguing that the 1982 Constitution’s “guaranteed freedoms” could be meaningless
given the caveats provided in Article 14 and noting the Constitution’s vague and
malleable language).
25. See ahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 35, 37
(discussing the opposing views that the headscarf ban either promotes secularism
and is “a symbol of a political Islam” or represents a religious duty or expression
of religious belief); Belelieu, supra note 21, at 584 (characterizing the Headgear
Act of November 28, 1925 as the first of several laws in Turkey to view dress as an
issue important to secularism); Bleiberg, supra note 17, at 140.
26. ahin, App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 36-37.
27. Id. ¶ 37.
28. Id.
29. Bleiberg, supra note 17, at 141.
30. See ahin, App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 38 (citing the
December 10, 1988 transitional section 16 of the Higher Education Act, which
provided that “[m]odern dress or appearance shall be compulsory in the rooms and
corridors of the institutions of higher education, preparatory schools, laboratories,
clinics and multidisciplinary clinics. A veil or headscarf covering the neck and hair
may be worn out of religious conviction”).
31. Bleiberg, supra note 17, at 141. As one note explains, the Constitutional
Court held that the amendment to the Higher Education Act offended the freedom
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constitutional values was a commitment to gender equality that was
incompatible with the Islamic principles the headscarf symbolized.32
Parliament passed a subsequent amendment to the Higher Education
Act that implied a right to wear headscarves as a right to “choice of
dress . . . that does not contravene the laws in force.” 33 The
Constitutional Court upheld the amendment, but noted that it did not
permit wearing a headscarf because the Court’s previous judgment
had already held the headscarf to be incompatible with the
Constitution. 34
As this short history suggests, the ban evolved from legislative
action to protect secularism (introduced by the NSC-controlled
Parliament) to a policy insulated from challenge (from a differentlycontrolled Parliament); from a prophylactic measure to a
constitutionally-mandated regulation necessary to secure secularism.
The introduction of gender equality, as part of and independent of a
defense of secularism, would become much clearer (and more
important) in Leyla ahin’s case before the European Court of
Human Rights.

II. THE CASE OF LEYLA AHIN
Leyla ahin was a medical student who enrolled in the Cerrahpa a
Faculty of Medicine at Istanbul University in 1998. 35 Later that year,
Istanbul University issued a circular that notified students with
beards or wearing headscarves that they would not be added to the
list of registered students and could not attend lectures or tutorials. 36
Students defying this circular were subject to discipline. ahin, who
had worn a headscarf throughout her time at a previous university in
Turkey, was denied entrance to an oncology exam and then refused
enrollment by the secretariat of the chair of orthopaedic
traumatology. 37 ahin challenged the circular before the Istanbul
Administrative Court, arguing that the ban infringed her Article 8
of religion because it singled out one religious symbol (the headscarf) for state
regulation rather than being neutral as to all forms of religious expression. Id. at
142.
32. Leila ahin, App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 39.
33. Id. ¶ 40.
34. Id. ¶ 41.
35. Id. ¶ 15.
36. Id. ¶ 16.
37. Id. ¶ 17.
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right to respect for private and family life; 38 Article 9 right to
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; 39 Article 14 right to
non-discrimination 40 under the ECHR as well as her right to
education under Article 2 of the First Protocol to the ECHR. 41 The
Istanbul Administrative Court dismissed her application, and the
Supreme Administrative Court rejected her appeal. 42 ahin continued
to wear a headscarf and was ultimately suspended from the
university for a semester. 43 She returned to the Istanbul
Administrative Court and petitioned for her suspension to be set
aside, but her application was dismissed. 44 In 1999, ahin left Turkey
and enrolled at Vienna University. 45
ahin pursued her case before the European Court of Human
Rights. A Chamber of the Court upheld the ban in 2004, finding no

38. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR] (“(1)
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary . . . .”).
39. See id. art. 9(1) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”).
40. See id. art. 14 (“The enjoyment of rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secure without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race,
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”).
41. See Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 (“No person shall
be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes
in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents
to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and
philosophical convictions.”). ahin’s claim under Article 2 of the First Protocol
was that “there was no statutory basis for the circular” and that the university
department issuing the circular had no regulatory authority. Leila ahin, App. No.
44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 18.
42. ahin, App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 19-20.
43. See id. ¶¶ 21-25 (describing the series of escalating disciplinary actions
taken against ahin, culminating in her suspension).
44. Id. ¶ 25. ahin had been granted amnesty after disciplinary action had been
taken against her by the university under a law that was ultimately struck down by
the Constitutional Court of Turkey. Id. ¶ 26. On appeal, the Supreme
Administrative Court held that amnesty made it unnecessary to examine the merits
of ahin’s case. Id. ¶ 27.
45. Id. ¶ 28.
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violation of ahin’s right to religious expression under Article 9 and
no distinct claims of merit under Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR, or
Article 2 of the First Protocol. 46 ahin requested reconsideration
before the Grand Chamber.

A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In a judgment issued in 2005, the Grand Chamber of the Court
upheld the headscarf ban under Articles 8, 9, and 14 of the ECHR
and Article 2 of the First Protocol to the ECHR. 47 Contrary to the
Chamber’s 2004 ruling, the Grand Chamber held that the ban
restricted ahin’s religious expression in violation of Article 9(1), but
was justified under Article 9(2). 48 Article 9(2) states that the right to
religious expression “shall be subject only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 49
The Court held that the ban was prescribed by law because it was
clear before ahin attended classes that the university prohibited
wearing a headscarf; 50 legitimate because the law furthered state
interests in protecting the rights and freedoms of others and
maintaining public order by promoting secularism; 51 and necessary
in a democratic society because the ban embodied pluralism,
secularism, and gender equality—principles fundamental to the
Court’s interpretation of Turkish democracy. 52

46. Id. ¶ 8; see also id. ¶¶ 106, 127, 157-65 (finding that Article 9 permits
restrictions on religious practices in order to manifest respect for differing
practices and that the right to education under Article 2 of the First Protocol is not
necessarily violated by banning the headscarf from universities).
47. See id. ¶ 165 (dealing briefly with ahin’s discrimination under Article 14,
stating, first, that ahin “did not provide detailed particulars in her pleadings,” and
second, that “the reasons which led the Court to conclude that there has been no
violation of Article 9 . . . incontestably also apply to the complaint under Article
14”).
48. Id. ¶¶ 71-75, 99.
49. ECHR, supra note 38, art. 9(2).
50. See ahin, App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 84 (stating that the
law prescribing conduct must be sufficiently clear such that the consequences are
foreseeable).
51. See id. ¶ 99 (noting that both parties agreed that the purpose of the law was
to protect public order).
52. Id. ¶ 116.
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Even though the Court’s holding was based on religious
expression, a discussion of gender equality pervades the opinion. The
Court’s attention to gender equality was not part of an Article 14 sex
discrimination claim. Rather, ahin argued that the ban on
headscarves required students to choose between their education and
their religion and thus discriminated between believers and nonbelievers. Despite the absence of a gender equality argument offered
by ahin, the Court relied on familiar, though poorly supported,
assumptions about the harm to women that toleration of headscarves
might cause. In the “History and Background” section of the opinion,
the Court grounded the protection of secularism in Turkey’s
recognition of gender equality:
The defining feature of the [Turkish] Republican ideal was
the presence of women in public life and their active
participation in society. Consequently, the ideas that women
should be freed from religious constraints and that society
should be modernised had a common origin. Thus, on 17
February 1926 [Turkey’s] Civil Code was adopted, which
provided for equality of the sexes in the enjoyment of civic
rights, in particular with regard to divorce and succession.
Subsequently, through a constitutional amendment of 5
December 1934 (Article 10 of the 1924 Constitution), women
obtained equal political rights to men. 53
The Court proceeded to describe, in the terms used by the
Supreme Administrative Court of Turkey, why “the headscarf [is] in
the process of becoming the symbol of a vision that [is] contrary to
the freedoms of women.” 54 The Court defined secularism as the
freedom from religion (as well as the right to subscribe to religious
belief) and the duty of the state to endorse no religion. 55 The
headscarf, the Court reasoned, undermines that choice, and
symbolizes an “imposed” and “mandatory” tenet of Islam that is
contrary to secularism. 56 The religious values that mandate that
women wear a headscarf are “incompatible with those of
53. Id. ¶ 32.
54. Id. ¶ 93.
55. See id. ¶ 39 (distinguishing a right to choose whether to subscribe to
religious beliefs from a right to wear a specific religious attire).
56. See id. (explaining that, in a Muslim-majority country like Turkey, the
official endorsement of a headscarf would result in discrimination against secular
Muslims and non-Muslims who declined to wear a headscarf).
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contemporary society”—a modern, progressive society where
secularism rather than religion shapes women’s status. 57 The Court
suggested that the ban creates room for women’s freedom of
expression, whereas religion conscripts women into the service of
religious duty. 58 More subtly, the majority opinion’s treatment of
Turkey’s history links the promotion of a secular regime (the primary
justification for the ban) with greater civil freedoms for women; for
example, the Court suggests that only a secular government would
have granted women the right to vote and equal rights in the family
so early in the Republic’s life. The Court framed the ban as a policy
designed to protect the rights of women.
But the Court did not fully explain how wearing a headscarf and
the “particularities of Islam” might subordinate women. The Court
suggested that the headscarf has an inherently coercive effect,
regardless of whether the woman wearing it claims to have chosen
freely to do so. 59 The Court made this point in describing Dahlab v.
Switzerland, a case in which a Swiss law prohibited an elementary
school teacher from wearing a headscarf while teaching. 60 The Court
repeated reasoning from Dahlab: “[The Court] questioned whether
[the headscarf] might have some kind of proselytizing effect, seeing
that it appeared to be imposed on women by a religious precept that
was hard to reconcile with the principle of gender equality.” 61
Although the Court did not explain the incompatibility between
gender equality and certain forms of religious observance, or
describe the “religious precept” at work, the Court’s statements
depicted the headscarf as a symbol of the patriarchal family where
women live in a status subordinate to their fathers, husbands, and

57. Id. ¶ 39.
58. Id. See generally Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights: A
Contextual Analysis of Headscarves, Religious Expression, and Women’s Equality
Under International Law, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 367, 374-75 (2007)
(offering a critique of the relationships between secularism, religion, and women’s
rights).
59. ahin, App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 111 (“[M]easures taken
in universities to prevent certain fundamentalist religious movements from
exerting pressure on students who did not practise their religion or who belonged
to another religion were not considered to constitute interference for the purposes
of Article 9 of the Convention.”).
60. Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447, 463.
61. ahin, App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 111.
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sons. 62 The effect of that secondary status is to reduce opportunities
for women in education, employment, and other areas of public
life. 63 As suggested by the Court, the proselytizing effect is the
headscarf’s ability to communicate this subordination to all that view
it and to encourage Muslim women (and presumably Muslim men) to
adhere to those beliefs.
The ban, following from the Court’s reasoning, protects women
from a set of practices that would relegate women to a private, malecontrolled sphere. This characterization of Islam (as well as the
headscarf) embeds a threat to gender equality that is distinctly
substantive in nature. The Court’s focus on the headscarf’s effects,
both on the individual woman and on society as a whole, depends on
a vision of what a state must do to promote women’s full equality in
public life (here, by banning certain items of religious dress). In this
way, the Court used substantive equality as a legitimating principle
for the ban, the enforcement of which, the Court intimated, creates a
society more hospitable to women’s rights.

B. THE DISSENTING VIEW
Judge Tulkens, the sole dissenting judge in ahin, suggested a
competing view of the ban. First, Judge Tulkens criticized the
majority opinion for the dearth of its reasoning:
[W]hat, in fact, is the connection between the ban and sexual
equality? The judgment does not say. Indeed, what is the
signification of wearing the headscarf? . . . . It is not the
Court’s role to make an appraisal of this type—in this
instance a unilateral and negative one—of a religion or
religious practice, just as it is not its role to determine in a
general and abstract way the signification of wearing the
headscarf or to impose its viewpoint on the applicant. 64

62. See Pinar Ilkkaracan, Islam and Women’s Sexuality: A Research Report
from Turkey, in GOOD SEX: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES FROM THE WORLD’S
RELIGIONS 61, 63-64 (Patricia Beattie Jung, Mary E. Hunt & Radhika
Balakrishnan eds., 2001) (noting how Islamic beliefs as practiced may accord
women secondary status and limit women’s opportunities).
63. See generally Scott, supra note 1, at 153, 155, 157, 168 (describing
perceptions of Islam and the headscarf, including misunderstandings by nonMuslims about the meaning or significance of the headscarf).
64. ahin, App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 11-12 (Tulkens, J.,
dissenting).
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If a headscarf in fact undermines gender equality, Judge Tulkens,
asked where is the majority’s proof that the headscarf ban has
promoted women’s equality in Turkey? The dissent expressed
concern that the majority’s conception of Islamic belief ignored the
significance that the headscarf has for the woman wearing it and
fashioned a false choice between religious freedom and gender
equality. 65 Judge Tulkens explained further what troubled her about
the majority opinion in this regard:
I fail to see how the principle of sexual equality can justify
prohibiting a woman from following a practice which, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, she must be taken to have
freely adopted. Equality and non-discrimination are
subjective rights which must remain under the control of
those who are entitled to benefit from them. “Paternalism” of
this sort runs counter to the case-law of the Court, which has
developed a real right to personal autonomy . . . . 66
Judge Tulkens argued that it is not religious belief that endangers
women’s equality, but the state’s conscription of their expressional
choices. Without “concrete examples” showing how gender equality
(or secularism) is at risk without the ban, its known impact is that
women like Leyla ahin are subjected to state paternalism that limits
their personal choices. 67
Judge Tulkens was also unconvinced by the Court’s argument that
the headscarf has a coercive effect on other women. Specifically,
Judge Tulkens stated that the analogy to Dahlab appeared strained
given the different facts of the two cases. 68 Central to the Court’s
reasoning in Dahlab was the influence of a state school teacher over

65. Id. See generally Nusrat Choudhury, From the Stasi Commission to the
European Court of Human Rights: L’Affaire du Foulard and the Challenge of
Protecting the Rights of Muslim Girls, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 199, 254
(2007); Catherine Powell, Lifting Our Veil of Ignorance: Culture,
Constitutionalism, and Women’s Human Rights in Post-September 11 America, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 331, 334-35 (2005).
66. ahin, App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 12 (Tulkens, J.,
dissenting).
67. Id. ¶ 5.
68. See id. ¶¶ 7-8 (distinguishing Dahlab by noting that ahin was not a teacher
of young, impressionable children, nor, as a student, had she “voluntarily taken [a]
post[ ] in a neutral environment”).
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young children in compulsory primary education, 69 and the
petitioner’s choice to teach in a state school system that has a wellestablished interest in pluralism. 70
The dissent went beyond criticizing the majority’s reasoning as
deficient. The dissent argued that the ban itself may have worrying
consequences for women’s equality. According to Judge Tulkens, the
ban may work to women’s disadvantage by reducing women’s
access to higher education and prohibiting some observant, Muslim
women from seeking a university education where “the true meaning
of [secularism and equality] can take shape and develop.” 71 The
dissent concluded that exclusion from higher education, and the
resulting obstacles to achieving professional success, may have
consequences for women’s equality more detrimental than the repeal
of the headscarf ban.
But like the majority, Judge Tulkens offered no proof of the ban’s
potential impact on women, other than to suggest that women like
ahin who resist the ban and are thus excluded from education are
emblematic of the ban’s consequences. Both the dissent and the
majority call for the recognition of women’s experience in a society
with or without the ban and reach opposite conclusions. Both assert
that their respective conception of equality best promotes a more just
society for women. In the next Part, this Article tests those
conclusions by examining the gender equality movement in Turkey
and campaign to incorporate international human rights norms as
part of Turkey’s plan to accede to the European Union.

69. Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447, 45810 (comparing the
effect of a teacher wearing a headscarf on the student versus the student wearing a
headscarf).
70. Id. at 459.
71. ahin, App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 18-19 (Tulkens, J.,
dissenting). Fatma Gök and Deniz Ilgaz describe women’s education levels in
Turkey as sub-par in comparison to men’s: for example, the illiteracy rate for
women, at least in 2003, was three times that of men’s. Fatma Gök & Den z Ilgaz,
The Right to Education, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY 130, 134 (Zehra F.
Kabasakal Arat ed., 2007); see also COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT,
TURKEY 2008 PROGRESS REPORT 20 (May 11, 2008), available at
http://www.cor.europa.eu/ cor_cms/ui/ViewDocument.aspx?contentid=66f3aea1d9ac-4cd2-b8710eb1a4782
f54 [hereinafter TURKEY PROGRESS REPORT] (noting “[w]omen’s access to
education is the lowest among the EU Member States”).
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III. THE DUAL ROLE OF SUBSTANTIVE
EQUALITY
ahin does not indicate where one might look to understand these
competing accounts of what women’s lives are like. CEDAW has
been offered as a lens through which to examine what serves
women’s interests. 72 As the primary international convention on
women’s rights, CEDAW encapsulates (and helped shape) the
meaning of substantive equality. 73 In describing the object and
purpose of CEDAW, General Recommendation 25 adopted by the
CEDAW Committee makes clear that CEDAW aims to eliminate de
jure and de facto discrimination. 74 The Recommendation accords de
facto equality and substantive equality the same meaning in that both
are strategies seeking to “achieve equality of result” and to
redistribute resources and power between men and women. 75 For
women’s rights advocates disappointed by the limits of formal
equality, substantive equality presents an opportunity to recognize
women’s differences from men as a source of continuing
disadvantage even if law accords men and women the same rights or
status. 76
CEDAW’s embrace of substantive equality has influenced
national definitions of equality and domestic gender debates. 77 This
72. Bennoune, supra note 58, at 375, 402-03 (describing CEDAW as the
“international yardstick” for measuring a country’s success in eliminating
discrimination against women).
73. See Rebecca J. Cook & Susannah Howard, Accommodating Women’s
Differences Under the Women’s Anti-Discrimination Convention, 56 EMORY L.J.
1039, 1043-48 (2007) (explaining how CEDAW envisions transformative and
substantive equality); see also Fredman, supra note 6, at 116 (noting that CEDAW,
by its very title, does not seek to abolish all gender distinctions, but rather to
eliminate discrimination).
74. General Assembly, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/59/38/Annex (2004).
75. Id. ¶ 9.
76. See Fredman, supra note 6, at 115-16 (noting that “[e]quality as
transformation does not aim at a gender neutral future, but one which appropriately
takes gender into account”); see also Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Feminism and
International Law: An Opportunity for Transformation, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
345, 356 (2002) (“Rights-based narratives are not the only powerful narratives—
and in some cultural contexts they may be much less effective than in others—but
for many of the world’s women, they offer the best way to buttress arguments for
change.”).
77. See Mattias Kumm, Democratic Constitutionalism Encounters
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influence is particularly strong when national institutions and
instruments require that domestic law comply with international
standards. 78 Under the Turkish Constitution, for example,
international law supersedes national law when the two conflict, 79
and the Constitutional Court of Turkey has been described as
“progressive” in referencing CEDAW in its jurisprudence. 80
Two campaigns came together to strengthen support for gender
equality principles: the movement for women’s rights led by local
activists and accession to the European Union. Both agendas rely on
CEDAW and frame legal reforms for women as equality issues.
Substantive equality, however, may sit uncomfortably with the
headscarf issue because the focus on equality might mask the deeper
implications of the ban, such as the extent to which a government
may repress religious expression for political ends. While the
accession and the women’s rights agendas revolve around
international alliances and the revision of legislation and the
Constitution, the ban has a complicated relationship with women’s
experiences and state priorities.

A. GENDER EQUALITY AGENDA
Early gains in civil and political rights for women took place as
part of a nation-building project for the Republic and due to agitation
from women’s rights advocates. More attentive to women’s rights
than most governments of the region at that time, Turkey granted
complete suffrage to women in 1934 after women mobilized to
pressure Atatürk and his single-party government for suffrage. 81
International Law: Terms of Engagement, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
IDEAS 256, 277 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006) (arguing that human rights treaties
exert a moral influence on the interpretation of domestic rights and their legitimacy
is premised on “[o]utcome related reasons”).
78. Id. at 280.
79. TURK. CONST. art. 90 (“International agreements duly put into effect bear
the force of law.”)
80. Yasemin Çelik Levin, The Effect of CEDAW on Women’s Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY, supra note 17, at 202, 208 (Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat
ed., 2007). At the same time, the Constitutional Court has been criticized for
employing an overly formalistic account of equality, despite being a signatory to
CEDAW. Hilal Elver, Gender Equality from a Constitutional Perspective: The
Case of Turkey, in THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 285, 289
(Beverly Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marin eds., 2004).
81. See Yildiz Ecevit, Women’s Rights, Women’s Organizations, and the State,
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Property law reform gave women increased rights of ownership, and
liberalized family laws eliminated polygamy and amended the
grounds for divorce to be the same for women and men. 82 These
early reforms in the Kemalist era envisioned women as protectors of
secularism, and granted women rights as a means to “strike at the
foundations of the religious hegemony.” 83
Continued discrimination in law and gender segregation in Turkish
society signaled the prevalence of de jure as well as de facto
inequality. 84 Reform strategies pursued by activists fared poorly until
the 1990s when the gender equality movement’s campaign to
implement the provisions of CEDAW 85 found support in Turkey’s
agenda to accede to the European Union.86 A well-established human
rights regime is at the core of the requirements for accession. 87
Turkey’s commitment to constitutional revision and ratification of
international human rights agreements reflects its accession agenda. 88
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY, supra note 17, at 187, 188-91 (Zehra F. Kabasakal
Arat ed., 2007) (summarizing the history of the Turkish women’s suffrage
movement).
82. Yildirim, supra note 17, at 357-58.
83. Pınar lkkaracan, Women for Women’s Human Rights, A Brief Overview of
Women’s Movement(s) in Turkey (and the Influence of Political Discourses), at 5,
Sept. 1997.
84. Levin, supra note 80, at 204 (noting continued gender segregation in
Turkish society, particularly in the workplace and in family life).
85. See Ecevit, supra note 81, at 199 (referencing about 300 women’s rights
organizations engaged in campaigns to promote compliance with and CEDAW).
86. See id. at 199-200 (listing withdrawal of reservations to CEDAW’s
Optional Protocol and the enactment of a new Labor Code with more favorable
provisions for women as a step taken to build a case for Turkey’s accession to the
European Union).
87. See European Council in Copenhagen, Conclusions of the Presidency, June
21-22, 1993, at 13, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_
Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2009) (emphasizing
that the standards by which Turkey, or any other country seeking membership, will
be judged for admittance to the European Union include: adhering to the rule of
law, maintaining a functional market economy, stabilizing democratic institutions,
and promoting human rights principles); see also Treaty on European Union art.
J.1(2), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) (stating the objectives of the foreign and
security policy of the European Union, including promoting democracy, rule of
law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms); Arat, supra note 24, at 97 (stating
that since 1999, one-third of Turkey’s Constitution has been amended in order to
comply with the Copenhagen criteria); Denli, supra note 17, at 97 (noting that
most of Turkey’s constitutional reforms address “freedom of religion and
consciousness, freedom of expression, and freedom of association”).
88. See TURKEY PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 71, at 6-7 (recounting steps that
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Turkey ratified CEDAW’s Optional Protocol in 2002, 89 and designed
partnerships between national machinery and international bodies to
help the country meet its international obligations. Turkey’s
Directorate General on the Status and Problems of Women received
support from the United Nations Development Program to create a
new set of institutions—for example, the National Program for the
Enhancement of Women’s Integration in Development Project. 90 The
World Bank sponsored a project with the Directorate to study aspects
of workplace discrimination against women and sexual harassment. 91
This activism gained momentum as Turkish women’s rights activists
identified with global feminism:
Women from different NGOs participated in the Fourth
World Women’s Conference in Beijing in 1995. Particularly
important in this respect was the Habitat Conference held in
Istanbul in 1996. This conference allowed many women’s
organizations to acquire pro-feminist perspectives, revise
their agendas, and strengthen their resolve. 92
State support for the implementation of CEDAW translated to law
reform efforts on the national level93 with the reform of the penal and
civil codes and constitutional amendments as its primary
objectives. 94 The Turkish government amended the Constitution in
two significant ways: First, the equality article now states that
“[m]en and women shall have equal rights” and obligates the state to

Turkey has taken to meet the criteria for accession and noting areas that require
improvement).
89. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp.
No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4 (Oct. 15, 1999); Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination, Signatures and
Ascensions, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/
sigop.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
90. See Levin, supra note 80, at 207 (noting that the goal of the National
Program for the Enhancement of Women’s Integration in Development Project is
“to change the negative images of women in all fields of life and to integrate
women’s issues into development plans”).
91. Id. at 211.
92. Ecevit, supra note 81, at 201.
93. See generally Levin, supra note 80 (citing adoption of penalties for
“custom killings” as an attempt to comply with CEDAW).
94. See id. at 210 (noting that the revised penal code of 2004 addressed several
conflicts with Article 2 of CEDAW).
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“realize this equality in life.” 95 Second, a right guaranteeing equality
between husbands and wives in a family was added. 96 Effective in
2002, significant changes to the Civil Code were made as a part of
the country’s CEDAW reform agenda: For example, amendments
deleted references to a husband’s legal status as “the head of the
family”; gave spouses equal rights over martial property; and
abolished the legal distinction of illegitimate children. 97 Revision of
the Penal Code followed in 2004: amendments included making
sexual harassment and marital rape crimes; increasing sentences for
sexual crimes; removing references to consensual rape and the
defense of marriage to rape; redefining customary killings as
aggravated homicide; and removing legal distinctions between
virgin, non-virgin, married, and unmarried women. 98 These reforms
do not appear to be efforts to purge the civil or penal code of its
Islamic character. Instead, these projects were intended to meet the
international expectations of how law should accord status to women
in a member state of the European Union.
Absent from this agenda is the headscarf; it appears that the ban
does not readily figure into this campaign as helping women achieve
substantive equality or, alternatively, threatening women’s
equality. 99 This point is illustrated in Turkey’s 2008 Progress Report

95. TURK. CONT. art 10.
96. TURK. CONT. art. 41; see also Levin, supra note 80, at 208 (noting the
Constitutional Court’s decision to decriminalize adultery because Turkish law had
defined different standards for men and women).
97. Women for Women’s Human Rights, The Campaign for Full Gender
Equality in the Civil Code, http://www.wwhr.org/civilcode_reform.php (last
visited Mar. 23, 2009); see also Yildirim, supra note 17, at 365-66 (noting that the
new Civil Code establishes a married couple’s right to choose the form of
ownership over marital property).
98. See generally Women for Women’s Human Rights, The Campaign for the
Reform of the Penal Code from a Gender Perspective, http://www.wwhr.org/
penalcode_reform.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).
99. Women for Women’s Human Rights, one of Turkey’s leading women’s
rights groups, embarked on “the most widespread, sustainable and comprehensive”
human rights education campaign for women, and none of the materials on its
website mention the ban. Women for Women’s Human Rights, About Us,
http://www.wwhr.org/biz_kimiz.php (last visited May 14, 2009); see also Levin,
supra note 80, at 209-10 (explaining that Turkey’s National Action Plan
emphasized “critical areas of concern,” of which the headscarf ban—its continued
enforcement or its repeal—was not one); Women for Women’s Human Rights,
Human Rights Education Program for Women (HREP), http://www.wwhr.org/
hrep.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2009) (listing the objectives of the organization’s
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issued by the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council Enlargement on obstacles to Turkey’s accession to the
European Union. The report notes that “the legal framework
guaranteeing women’s rights and gender equality is broadly in place”
but that “significant efforts are needed” to prevent honor killings and
domestic violence and to reduce educational and employment
disparities between men and women. 100 The headscarf is mentioned
only once in the context of a Constitutional Court case described
below. This lone reference is not made in terms of equality or
women’s rights, but is expressed as a concern with the freedom of
association of political parties. 101

B. CEDAW AND THE HEADSCARF BAN
The CEDAW Committee has considered the ban, and its treatment
of the issue looked similar to the arguments advanced by the ahin
dissent. At the 32nd Session of the CEDAW Committee in January
2005, Turkey presented its fourth and fifth periodic reports to the
Committee. The CEDAW Committee praised Turkey for its
ratification of international documents like CEDAW’s Optional
Protocol and noted Turkish women’s representation in international
organizations such as the Commission on the Status of Women. 102
Several members of the Committee questioned Turkish state
representatives about the impact of the headscarf ban and expressed
concerns about its potential consequences. For example, Committee
Member Françoise Gaspard “expressed concern that [the ban was]
human rights education campaign for women in Turkey, such as informing them of
their constitutional, civil, and economic rights); Women for Women’s Human
Rights, Coalition for Sexual and Bodily Rights in Muslim Societies (CSBR)
Sexuality Institute 2008, 16-23 Aug. 2008, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,
http://www.wwhr.org/news.php?detay=25 (listing issues that the organization will
address to promote understanding of sexuality in Muslim societies, such as honor
crimes, forced marriage, and sexual health and reproduction rights).
100. TURKEY PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 71, at 21.
101. See id. at 6-7 (reporting that in February of 2008, the Parliament amended
Article 10 and Article 42 to lift the ban on headscarf for university students, but
later that year the Constitutional Court annulled the amendments for offending “the
secular nature of the state”).
102. See Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
Summary Record of the 678th Meeting, ¶¶ 3, 7, 14, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.678
(Jan. 20, 2005) (reporting, for example, that the Ministry of Labour and Social
Security had distributed grants in order to bolster employment of various
underrepresented groups, including women).
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incompatible with the right to equal access to education and
employment.” 103 Committee Member Salma Kahn questioned why
headscarves were singled out as contraband religious symbols, which
could offend a woman’s right to freedom of religious expression. 104
Committee Member Mary Regina Tavares da Silva asked if the ban
was itself a form of oppression, particularly for women in rural areas
who predominantly wear headscarves. 105 In response to the
Committee’s questions about the ban’s potential to deter women
from seeking higher education, the Turkish government’s
representative stated that “[i]n Turkey there are no legal obstacles for
girls to go to school; on the contrary, there are efforts to increase the
number of girls that go to school.” After describing the regulations
prohibiting beards (as well as headscarves), the representative further
commented: “There is no discrimination between men and women in
the regulations regarding outfits. The rules to be followed by both
men and women are clearly stated.” 106
The state’s justification is one based on principles of formal
equality: The ban treats men and women equally because both sexes
are denied the right to manifest certain religious beliefs. This
explanation appears out of step with the CEDAW Committee’s
concern that laws respect women’s substantive equality. 107 However,
the Committee’s Concluding Comment does not note this, and does
not draw a conclusion about the effect of the ban. 108 The Concluding
103. Id. ¶ 13.
104. See Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
Summary Record of the 677th Meeting, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.677 (Jan.
20, 2005) (querying how officials hoped to integrate rural women into mainstream
society on an equal basis if they were banned from wearing headscarves in public
schools and hospitals).
105. Id. ¶ 13.
106. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, PreSession Working Group, Responses to the List of Issues and Questions for
Consideration of the Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports, ¶ 26, U.N.
Doc. CEDAW/PSWG/2005/I/CRP.2/Add.7 (Jan. 10-28, 2005).
107. See Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Concluding Comments, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/TUR/4-5 (Feb. 15, 2005), ¶ 34
(questioning whether the legal gains for women’s rights result in social change by
noting an NGO survey finding that 55% of Turkish women need their husband’s
permission before leaving the home).
108. See generally Women for Women’s Human Rights, Shadow NGO Report
on Turkey’s Fourth and Fifth Combined Periodic Report to the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, http://www.wwhr.org/files/
WWHRNewWaysShadowReportTurkey.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2009) (assessing
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Comment asked for “the State party to monitor and assess the impact
of the ban on wearing headscarves and to compile information on the
number of women who have been excluded from schools and
universities because of the ban.” 109 The Committee made no
recommendation as to the ban’s continued enforcement. Instead, the
comment asked the Turkish government to gather evidence of the
ban’s effect on women’s equality—evidence that the majority and
dissent in ahin presumed exists but may be difficult to capture fully
using an equality perspective. 110

IV. THE PROBLEM WITH SUBSTANTIVE
EQUALITY?
Substantive equality may not explain how women are affected by
the headscarf ban. First, substantive equality is employed too
narrowly and too broadly in this situation. The application of
substantive equality may be too broad because characteristics in
addition to gender, such as rural or urban residence and socioeconomic status, may prove instructive as to the ban’s effect. 111 For
example, between 62% and 69% of all Turkish women wear a
headscarf, 112 and within that group is a diversity of views and
lifestyles. Closer examination of that population may show divergent
reasons for why the ban affects some women more distinctly than
others. Pınar lkkaracan has demonstrated that complexity by noting
the role of urbanization and migration to cities by predominantly
Islamic women and the lack of social and economic support for

the substantive impact of constitutional amendments regarding gender equality, but
not addressing the headscarf ban).
109. Concluding Comments, supra note 107, ¶ 28.
110. Cf. AKDER, A Statistical Examination of the Condition of Women in
Turkey and the Impact of the Headscarf Ban on Turkey’s Gender Equality Ranking
(2008), http://www.ak-der.org/?p=reports&lang=eng&m=a8445719836f2d5e8b51
986410e14728 (suggesting that because two thirds of all women over the age of 17
wear a headscarf and substantial amounts of female students are adversely affected
by the headscarf ban).
111. See Dhanmanjiri Sathe, Talking Headscarves in Turkey, INDIAN EXPRESS,
Aug. 5, 2007, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/Talking-headscarves-in-Turkey
/208766 (explaining that,“[t]he hijab, or headscarf, is more of a class issue than a
gender issue”).
112. See AKDER, supra note 110 (citing a 2006 report by TESEV Religion
Society and Politics in Changing Turkey and a 2007 report by Milliyet/KONDA
Research Center).
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women moving to urban areas for work. The women’s rights group,
AKDER, recently issued a report that illustrates the ways in which
the ban harms already marginalized women by further exacerbating
access to the workplace for low-income women or access to urban
resources for rural women. 113 Sub-populations of women wearing
headscarves may share characteristics that are stronger indicators of
their disadvantage than gender.
A substantive equality analysis may be too narrow as well. A
return to the Court’s reasoning in ahin highlights the point. What
offends equality principles is what diminishes women’s status as
women. The majority’s apparent focus is on the ways in which
religion subjects women to stigma based on their gendered
characteristics—the role that Islam presupposes for women or the
effect that women would feel viewing the headscarf on other women.
The dissent makes similar claims about the specific gendered effect
of the ban: that women’s exclusion from education will perpetuate
attitudes of women’s inferiority, and more education for women will
result in greater societal equality. The analysis is too narrow because
it fails to adequately weigh the implications of repressive state
conduct—in the name of secularism—on women (or does not weigh
the implications of repressive state conduct at all). The Court’s
reliance on substantive equality may not elucidate the consequences
of the ban on speech that challenges state power (however
configured) and could potentially undermine the Court’s intention to
foster an environment where women’s rights thrive. 114
Second, the promise of substantive equality, as embodied in
CEDAW, is that an evaluation of women’s experiences can solve
problems of over- and under-inclusion. But this has been easier said
than done in the headscarf debate. Some have suggested the problem

113. See id. (suggesting that women who wear the headscarf are not hired often
by private firms because employers stereotype them as being aligned with
fundamentalist Islam).
114. See JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK
FROM FEMINISM 321, 341-43 (2006) (noting the consequences of feminism’s
failure to consider the costs of advancing a feminist agenda); see also Brenda
Cossman et al., Gender, Sexuality, and Power: Is Feminist Theory Enough?, 12
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 601, 608 (2003) (Janet Halley writing that the feminist
movement’s inability to “see injury to men by women” and criticizing “this
refusal” as “a textbook case of bad faith”).
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is with CEDAW. 115 Beyond a feminist critique of the adequacy of
rights, 116 it is not altogether clear how context should be evaluated in
determining what reforms might redress women’s lived
discrimination. The court in enforcing the ban (or the legislature in
attempting to repeal it) is one place to look. 117 Indeed, the type of
substantive equality envisioned by CEDAW and echoed in ahin
works at the behest of state power and its successful recognition
depends on the state. 118 But implementing measures to promote
gender equality in order to be in compliance with CEDAW may not
avoid state co-optation of gender equality for political purposes. 119
As demonstrated by the Court in ahin, a state may claim that it is
acting to further women’s equality, but the failure to justify its

115. See Brooks, supra note 76, at 351 (suggesting that CEDAW might be
unresponsive to the headscarf debate because the equality norms in CEDAW are
patterned after the rights that have been important to men, which are by and large
civil and political rights); Choudhury, supra note 65, at 253 (arguing that equality
rights of the kind found in CEDAW do not adequately recognize women’s rights to
religious and cultural expression).
116. See Tracy Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 103-04 (1996) (proposing that global feminists have
spent much of their advocacy efforts on considerations of the adequacy of rights
rather than the justification for implementing those rights).
117. See Belelieu, supra note 21, at 585 (observing that while the Constitutional
Court and secular establishment have supported banning headscarves, the
legislature has amended the Higher Education Act twice to permit freedom of
choice of dress at universities).
118. Cf. Tracy E. Higgins, Are Women Human? And Other International
Dialogues By Catharine A. MacKinnon, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 523, 538 (2006)
(book review) (“[N]o matter how good the legal definition of equality might be, no
matter how fully the Aristotelian concept of equality is repudiated in favor of
substantive equality, the unequal conditions . . . women live [in] will not change
without the exercise of state power, something that women do not fully control”).
119. See Andrew Byrnes, Toward More Effective Enforcement of Women’s
Human Rights Through the Use of International Human Rights Law and
Procedures, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 189, 192 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) (noting that states comply
with human rights law for any number of self-serving reasons; for example, a state
may seek to be in compliance with human rights law to minimize pressure from
other states or civil society or the state desires the prestige and the status that
results from appearing to be gender equality compliant); see also Darren
Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender: Why International Law Theory Should Adopt
Comparative Methods, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 759, 774-76 (2007)
(proposing that international law compliance increases respect from other
countries).
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actions using a litmus test of outcome or results may mean that
women’s rights are either too narrowly or too broadly understood. 120
Two recent cases decided by the Constitutional Court of Turkey
are illustrative. The first decision struck down constitutional
amendments that would have created an exception for students
wishing to wear a headscarf. 121 The amendments were proposed by
the ruling party in government, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (“AK
Parti”), which has supported measures to overturn the ban. 122 The
Constitutional Court struck down the amendments by relying on an
implied, constitutional power to annul provisions that are contrary to
secularism. This aspect of the court’s decision has been criticized as
overstepping its authority: Article 148 of the Turkish Constitution
appears to give the court power to review the procedure of
constitutional amendment, but not the substance of the
amendments. 123 The second case was brought by the public
prosecutor against the AK Parti, charging that the AK Parti’s actions
in proposing the constitutional amendments were contrary to the

120. See Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist
Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four
Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335,
341-42 (2006) (contrasting governance feminism’s focus on stringent criminal
enforcement with international environmental law, which concerns principles that
are “negotiated” and “rearranged” according to evolving interests).
121. Law Number 5735, on Amending Certain Articles in the Constitution of the
Republic of Turkey art. 1-2. The law would have added a clause to Article 42 of
the Constitution of Turkey, Right and Duty to Training and Education: “No one
shall be prevented from exercising the right to higher education for any reason not
explicitly set forth in the law. Restrictions to the exercise of this right shall be
determined by the law.” Id. The phrase, “and in utilization of public services of
every sort,” would have been added to Article 10, Equality before the Law, to
conclude the sentence: “State organs and administrative authorities shall act in
compliance with the principle of equality before the law in all their proceedings.”
Id.; see also Greenville Byford, In Crisis, NEWSWEEK, June 18, 2008, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/id/142058 (arguing that the amendments’ language did
not specifically mention the headscarf and therefore would not only protect
women’s right to wear a headscarf, but also the right not to wear a headscarf).
122. See Noah Feldman, Op-Ed., Veiled Democracy?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2008,
at A19 (noting that the introduction of the amendments may have been poorly
timed and politically risky).
123. See Metin Arslan, Turkey Heads Toward Juristocracy With Court’s Scarf
Ruling, TODAY’S ZAMAN, Oct. 24, 2008, http://www.todayszaman.com/tzweb/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=156798 (reporting the court’s reasoning that
when legislation is against “the fundamental principles of the Republic” they may
hear appeals regarding substance as well as procedure).
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principle of secularism. 124 In a close decision, the Constitutional
Court dismissed the case against the AK Parti, allowing it to remain
in power, but penalized the party by reducing its public financing by
half. 125 The case, which could have de-seated the democraticallyelected governing party, threatened accession negotiations with the
European Union, had a chilling effect on effort to reform the
constitution, 126 and highlighted the fragility of Turkish politics. 127
In both cases, the Constitutional Court invoked gender equality in
the same vague fashion as the ahin Court, 128 and in annulling the
amendment, the Court relied explicitly on ahin as justification.
Could the ahin Court have predicted that its decision would be the
basis of national court decisions that would draw Turkey into a
constitutional crisis? Probably not; a gender equality argument may
highlight background conditions related to improving women’s
status as women, but may also justify policies that threaten the
democratic process. “Authoritarian secularism” 129 is not just a

124. hsan Da i, AK Party Survives Closure Case: What is Next?, TODAY’S
ZAMAN, Aug. 25, 2008, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load
=detay&link=151167.
125. See Sabrina Tavernise & Sebnem Arsu, Court Declares Turkey’s Ruling
Party Constitutional but Limits its Financing, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2008, at A6
(describing the background of political and social tension in Turkey at the time of
the ruling).
126. See European Union Presses Turkey for Deeds, Not Words, TODAY’S
ZAMAN, Dec. 4, 2008, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=
detay&link=160580&bolum=102
(quoting
Dutch
Christian
Democrat
Parliamentarian Ria Oomen-Ruijten: “a clear signal to be given by the Turkish
government for proceeding with reforms, which have slowed down in the past
three years, will be for the good of both the European government and Turkey”).
127. See TURKEY PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 74, at 6-7, 69 (noting the case
brought against the AK Parti and the concerns it raised about state intervention in
political officials’ rights to freedom of expression and association); see also
Sabrina Tavernise, Turkey’s High Court Overtuns Headscarf Rule, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 2008, at A6 (predicting a “showdown between Turkey’s secular elite – its
military, judiciary and secular political party – and [Turkey’s prime minister], an
observant Muslim with an Islamist past”).
128. See Ergun Özbudun, Reasoning for the Headscarf Decision: New
Constitution is Now a Must, TODAY’S ZAMAN, Oct. 26, 2008, http://www.
todayszaman.come/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=156932 (criticizing the
Constitutional Court’s decision for being undemocratic).
129. TASPINAR, supra note 15, at 7-8 (employing the phrase “authoritarian
secularism” to illustrate how the headscarf ban may suppress religious expression
and thereby threaten democracy).
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concern for those aligned with Islamic politics. 130 Advocates for
gender equality have felt the sting of political censorship. Women’s
rights groups aligned with leftist politics have been under state
surveillance, had their offices raided, and their members arrested 131
and imprisoned. 132

CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the gender equality arguments relied
upon in ahin reveal problems with applying substantive equality to
the headscarf debate in Turkey. The intent of this Article is not to
critique compliance with international treaties like CEDAW or to
suggest that substantive equality cannot be a valuable, normative
tool. The invocation of substantive equality may serve well some
reform projects and provide support for amendments guaranteeing
gender equality in a constitution and in the civil and penal codes. But
substantive equality, applied without substance, may do little to
assist its intended beneficiaries and may obscure complex questions
of political importance for women (and men). Understanding
equality in context is a difficult task and ignoring law’s coercive
aspects or distributive consequences may undermine the very
outcome that women’s rights reform seeks to achieve. 133
130. Kavakçi v. Turquie, Requête. No. 71901/01, Eur. Ct. H.R., available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2009). A recent case of the
European Court of Human Rights overturned the decision of the Constitutional
Court of Turkey dissolving the Fazilet party based on allegations of anti-secular
activities and to strip its members elected to Parliament of their seats. Id. The
charge was supported by evidence introduced by the Principal State Counsel that
Merve Kavakçi, a newly-elected member, wore a headscarf when taking the oath
of office. The European Court of Human Rights did not rule on grounds of
religious expression, but held for Kavakçi on the grounds that the Court’s decision
violated Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the Convention, the right to free elections. Id.
The Court held that the sanctions imposed on the applicants were not proportionate
to the legitimate aim of protecting secularism. Id.
131. See Ecevit, supra note 83, at 194-95 (noting that state officials accused the
Association of Progressive Women of pursuing a socialist agenda).
132. See Women for Women’s Human Rights, Imprisoned Iranian Women's
Rights Activists, Nahid Keshavarz and Mahboubeh Hossein Zadeh, Writing Their
Experiences from Prison, http://www.wwhr.org/news.php?detay=9 (last visited
Mar. 24, 2009) (documenting the arrest and imprisonment of activists in April
2007 while collecting signatures in support of the One Million Signatures
Campaign—a campaign to end legal discrimination against women).
133. See Higgins, supra note 121, at 542 (criticizing Catharine MacKinnon for
failing to address when the law should “respect or override women’s choices”).

